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Shire ViroPharma, Inc. (“Shire”),1 manufactured 
and marketed the lucrative drug Vancocin, which is 
indicated to treat a life-threatening gastrointestinal 
infection.  After Shire got wind that manufacturers were 
considering making generic equivalents to Vancocin, it 
inundated the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) with allegedly meritless filings to 
delay approval of those generics.  The FDA eventually 
rejected Shire’s filings and approved generic equivalents 
to Vancocin, but the filings nonetheless resulted in a high 
cost to consumers—Shire had delayed generic entry for 
years and reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in profits. 
Nearly five years later—and after Shire had 
divested itself of Vancocin—the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) filed suit against Shire in the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware under 
Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 53(b).  The FTC sought a permanent injunction 
and restitution, alleging that Shire’s petitioning was an 
unfair method of competition prohibited by the Act.  Shire 
moved to dismiss, arguing that the FTC’s allegations of 
long-past petitioning activity failed to satisfy Section 
13(b)’s requirement that Shire “is violating” or “is about 
                                                 
1 Shire ViroPharma, Inc. is the corporate successor 
to ViroPharma, which it acquired in 2014—after the 
petitioning activity at issue in this case ceased. 
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to violate” the law.  The District Court agreed and 
dismissed the case. 
On appeal, the FTC urges us to adopt a more 
expansive view of Section 13(b).  According to the FTC, 
the phrase “is violating, or is about to violate” in Section 
13(b) is satisfied by showing a past violation and a 
reasonable likelihood of recurrent future conduct.  We 
reject the FTC’s invitation to stretch Section 13(b) beyond 
its clear text.  The FTC admits that Shire is not currently 
violating the law.  And the complaint fails to allege that 
Shire is about to violate the law.  We will therefore affirm 
the District Court’s judgment. 
I.2 
A. 
A company that wishes to manufacture and market 
a new drug in the United States must submit to the FDA a 
New Drug Application (“NDA”) demonstrating the safety 
                                                 
2 We derive the facts of this case from the FTC’s 
complaint.  In our review of the grant of the motion to 
dismiss, we take the allegations to be true and construe 
them in the light most favorable to the FTC.  In re: Tower 
Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 232 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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and efficacy of the product.3  Usually, the NDA filer 
demonstrates safety and efficacy by using expensive in 
vivo clinical endpoint studies, where researchers provide 
sick patients with either the proposed drug or a placebo to 
compare the safety and efficacy of the drug with the 
placebo.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 
U.S. 136, 142 (2013) (describing the “long, 
comprehensive, and costly testing process” underlying an 
NDA).  After FDA approval, the manufacturer must seek 
approval through a supplemental NDA if it wishes to 
change the drug or its label. 
A generic drug manufacturer need not file an NDA 
because it is essentially copying the approved branded 
drug.  The generic manufacturer must instead file an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which 
relies on the approved drug’s profile for safety and 
efficacy.  See id. (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by 
allowing the generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s 
                                                 
3 The regulatory scheme employed by the FDA is 
governed by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 301, as amended by the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman”), 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) 
(1994)), and the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
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approval efforts, speeds the introduction of low-cost 
generic drugs to market, thereby furthering drug 
competition.” (internal alteration, quotation marks, and 
citation omitted)).  The generic manufacturer must 
demonstrate, inter alia, that the proposed generic drug is 
bioequivalent to the referenced branded drug.4  See 21 
C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (defining bioequivalence as “the 
absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to 
which the active ingredient or active moiety in 
pharmaceutical equivalences or pharmaceutical 
alternatives becomes available at the site of drug 
action . . . .”). 
B. 
Shire develops, manufactures, and markets branded 
drugs.  Until Shire divested itself of the product in 2014, 
                                                 
4 The FDA has flexibility in determining how a 
manufacturer must establish bioequivalence.  See, e.g., 21 
C.F.R. § 320.24(a) (providing that the FDA may require 
either in vivo or in vitro studies to demonstrate 
bioequivalence). 
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this included Vancocin capsules.5  Vancocin capsules are 
an oral antibiotic used to treat Clostridium-difficile 
associated diarrhea, which is a serious, potentially life-
threatening gastrointestinal infection.  When Vancocin 
capsules were developed, the NDA did not include in vivo 
clinical endpoint studies because the capsules were an 
alternative delivery system to Vancocin oral solution, 
which the FDA already knew to be safe and effective.  
Instead, the NDA included in vitro dissolution data (which 
measures how quickly the capsules dissolve) and in vivo 
pharmacokinetic data (which compares the absorption of 
the drug in capsule form versus oral solution form). 
In April 1986, the FDA approved Vancocin 
capsules.  Shire acquired Vancocin capsules in November 
2004.  From then until 2011, Vancocin capsules were 
Shire’s largest revenue-generating product.  Vancocin 
capsules accounted for all of Shire’s net revenue until 
2009 and up to 53% of its net revenue in 2011.  United 
                                                 
5 We take judicial notice of this fact—which is not 
in the complaint—from Shire’s Form 8-K filings with the 
Securities Exchange Commission.  Shire plc, Form 8-K, 5 
(Oct. 24, 2014), https://bit.ly/2SxTOm8; see Oran v. 
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial 
notice of SEC filings). 
 
Case: 18-1807     Document: 003113168507     Page: 8      Date Filed: 02/25/2019
 9 
 
States sales for Vancocin capsules grew from $40 million 
in 2003 to almost $300 million in 2011. 
Generic manufacturers, attracted by Vancocin’s 
financial success, wanted to enter the market.  Vancocin 
was vulnerable to generic competition because it lacked 
both patent protection and regulatory exclusivity.  One 
primary barrier to generic entry remained—the FDA’s 
recommendation that generic manufacturers seeking to 
demonstrate bioequivalence conduct in vivo clinical 
endpoint studies.  Ironically, these tests were more 
expensive and onerous than the in vitro dissolution testing 
and in vivo pharmacokinetic studies that had been used to 
gain approval of Vancocin capsules in the first place.  The 
FDA apparently realized this inconsistency; in October 
2004 it convened a public meeting of the Advisory 
Committee for Pharmaceutical Science (the “Advisory 
Committee”)6 to reassess bioequivalence testing for 
locally-acting gastrointestinal drugs like Vancocin. 
Shire became increasingly concerned that the FDA 
might allow generic manufacturers to demonstrate 
bioequivalence using in vitro data.  Shire thus hired a 
                                                 
6 The Advisory Committee is a body of sixteen 
independent experts from academia, non-profits, and 
hospitals.  These experts are “knowledgeable in the fields 
of pharmaceutical sciences, clinical pharmacology, and 
gastrointestinal diseases.”  Compl. ¶ 85. 
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bioequivalence consultant to advise it on the FDA’s likely 
course of action.  In November 2005, the consultant 
confirmed Shire’s suspicions, advising Shire that the FDA 
would likely allow generic manufacturers to submit in 
vitro dissolution data to establish bioequivalence to 
Vancocin capsules.  The consultant counseled Shire to 
submit a citizen petition “sooner than later” but warned 
that without supporting clinical data, Shire “could not 
convince the FDA of its position against use of in vitro 
dissolution testing.”  Compl. ¶ 45. 
Shire’s fear came to pass:  the FDA indeed changed 
its position on bioequivalence testing for Vancocin 
capsules.  In February 2006, the FDA advised a generic 
manufacturer that bioequivalence for Vancocin capsules 
could be demonstrated by in vitro dissolution testing.  The 
FDA also shared this guidance with other generic 
manufacturers that inquired.  In March 2007, the first 
generic manufacturer submitted its ANDA for Vancocin 
capsules.  Two other generic manufacturers followed suit 
later that year. 
C. 
Not surprisingly, Shire wanted to protect its 
monopoly on the Vancocin market.  Among its options 
was a citizen petition.  The First Amendment guarantees 
individuals the right to petition the government.  U.S. 
Const. amend. I.  Consistent with that right, the 
Administrative Procedure Act permits any “interested 
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person” to petition a federal agency “for the issuance, 
amendment, or repeal of a rule.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(e); see 
also 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (FDA regulation governing citizen 
petitions). 
The filing of a citizen petition can substantially 
delay approval of a generic drug.  During the time period 
at issue here, the FDA automatically suspended ANDA 
approval if a branded manufacturer filed a citizen 
petition.7  The FDA is obligated to respond to every citizen 
petition within 180 days.8  Id. § 10.30(e)(5); see also 21 
                                                 
7 Although inapplicable to Shire’s citizen petition, 
Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act of 2007 to assuage the FDA’s fear that 
many brand manufacturers’ citizen petitions were 
meritless attempts to delay generic competition.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 355(q).  Post-2007, the FDA cannot delay ANDA 
approval due to a citizen petition unless “a delay is 
necessary to protect the public health.”  Id. 
§ 355(q)(1)(A)(ii).  Under the amendment, the FDA may 
also deny a citizen petition filed “with the primary purpose 
of delaying” ANDA approval that “does not on its face 
raise valid scientific or regulatory issues.”  Id. 
§ 355(q)(1)(E). 
 
8 This time period has since been shortened to 150 
days.  21 C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(5). 
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U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F).  But the FDA’s response need not 
dispose of the entire petition within that time.  The FDA 
may deny the petition, approve it in whole or in part, 
provide a tentative response, or delay a decision by 
modifying or postponing any suggested action.  See 21 
C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2)(i)–(iv). 
From March 2006 to April 2012, Shire submitted a 
total of forty-three filings to the FDA and instituted three 
federal court proceedings—all allegedly to delay the 
approval of generic Vancocin capsules by convincing the 
FDA to require ANDA applicants to conduct in vivo 
clinical endpoint studies.  Shire’s filings ranged from a 
citizen petition and amendments thereto to public 
comments on other manufacturers’ ANDAs.  Many of 
these filings were around the same time Shire suspected 
the FDA was nearing approval of generic equivalents to 
Vancocin. 
On April 9, 2012, the FDA rejected Shire’s citizen 
petition.9  The FDA concluded that Shire’s scientific 
challenges to the bioequivalence recommendation 
“lack[ed] merit” and “were unsupported.”  Compl. ¶ 104 
(internal quotation marks omitted); App. 77–95.  On that 
same day the FDA approved three ANDAs for generic 
                                                 
9 Shire did not prevail in any of its lawsuits, which 
were either dismissed or withdrawn. 
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Vancocin capsules.  Shire lost almost 70% of its unit sales 
for Vancocin capsules within three months. 
D. 
Nearly five years later, on February 7, 2017, the 
FTC sued Shire, seeking a permanent injunction and 
equitable monetary relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC 
Act.  The FTC claimed that Shire’s conduct—submitting 
serial, meritless filings—had harmed consumers and 
competition because it enabled Shire to maintain and 
extend its monopoly by delaying the FDA’s approval of 
generic alternatives to Vancocin capsules.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a). 
The FTC alleged that, absent an injunction, “there 
is a cognizable danger” that Shire will “engage in similar 
conduct causing future harm to competition and 
consumers.”  Compl. ¶ 150.  It based this assertion on 
Shire’s (1) knowledge that its petitioning campaign would 
enrich it at the expense of consumers; (2) incentive to 
engage in similar conduct in the future; and (3) 
opportunity to engage in similar conduct in the future.  As 
to the third point, the FTC specifically alleged that Shire 
“marketed and developed drug products,” namely 
Cinryze, “for commercial sale in the United States, and it 
could do so in the future.”  Id. ¶¶ 8, 151. 
Shire moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
the FTC had failed to plead sufficient facts to invoke its 
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authority under Section 13(b).  Shire also contended that 
its petitioning activity was immune from antitrust 
challenge pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  See 
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961); United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).  The FTC 
responded that Section 13(b) authorized its lawsuit and 
that Shire had engaged in sham petitioning, which is not 
protected by Noerr-Pennington. 
The District Court granted Shire’s motion to 
dismiss, ruling that the FTC had failed to plead sufficient 
facts to show that Shire “is violating, or is about to violate” 
the law.10  The Court flatly rejected the FTC’s contention 
that Shire was about to violate the law merely because it 
had the incentive and opportunity to engage in similar 
conduct in the future. 
                                                 
10 Despite the District Court’s grant of Shire’s 
motion to dismiss—which was couched in jurisdictional 
terms—the Court also reached Shire’s Noerr-Pennington 
defense.  The Court declined to dismiss the case on these 
grounds, explaining that the allegations in the complaint 
were sufficient to invoke the sham petitioning exception—
at least at the pleading stage.  Because we affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal, Shire’s Noerr-Pennington 
defense is not before us on appeal. 
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The FTC filed this timely appeal. 
II. 
We begin by addressing whether Section 13(b)’s 
requirements are jurisdictional.  The FTC contends that 
Section 13(b) is not jurisdictional while Shire argues the 
opposite.  The District Court appears to have assumed—
without expressly analyzing the issue—that Section 13(b) 
does not impose a jurisdictional requirement.11 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
instructed us to assume that statutory limitations are 
nonjurisdictional unless Congress provides otherwise.  In 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., the Court addressed whether Title 
VII’s definition of “employer” (which only includes those 
having fifteen or more employees) “affects federal-court 
subject-matter jurisdiction or, instead, delineates a 
substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim for relief.”  546 
U.S. 500, 503 (2006).  The Court held that it was the latter, 
cautioning courts against “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” 
                                                 
11 The District Court’s opinion was murky on this 
point, citing both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  At several points the District 
Court couched its inquiry as jurisdictional, yet still 
addressed the merits of Shire’s Noerr-Pennington defense.  
Regardless of the District Court’s conclusion, our review 
is plenary. 
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that fail to actually assess “whether the federal court had 
authority to adjudicate the claim in suit.”  Id. at 511 
(citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court reiterated that a plaintiff obtains 
the “basic statutory grant[]” of subject matter jurisdiction 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by pleading a colorable claim that 
arises under the Constitution or the laws of the United 
States.  Id. at 513.  The plaintiff in Arbaugh had invoked 
federal question jurisdiction by pleading a claim under 
Title VII.  Id.  The Court held that the fifteen-employee 
threshold went to the merits of the Title VII claim, 
explaining that Congress had not clearly delineated it as a 
jurisdictional requirement.  Id. at 514–16.  The Supreme 
Court created a “readily administrable bright line”—
“when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the 
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”  Id. at 516. 
Under the standard announced in Arbaugh, Section 
13(b)’s “is” or “is about to violate” requirement is 
nonjurisdictional.  Section 13(b) provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever the [FTC] has reason to believe— 
Case: 18-1807     Document: 003113168507     Page: 16      Date Filed: 02/25/2019
 17 
 
(1) that any person, partnership, or 
corporation is violating, or is about to 
violate, any provision of law enforced 
by the [FTC,] and 
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the 
issuance of a complaint by the [FTC] 
and until such complaint is dismissed 
by the [FTC] or set aside by the court 
on review, or until the order of the 
[FTC] made thereon has become final, 
would be in the interest of the public— 
the [FTC] . . . may bring suit in a district court 
of the United States to enjoin any such act or 
practice. 
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (emphasis added). 
The FTC’s claim arises under a law of the United 
States—15 U.S.C. § 53(b).  It thus falls within the general 
grant of jurisdiction in § 1331.  The District Court also had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a) and 1345. 
Section 13(b) includes no indicia that Congress 
intended to “rank a statutory limitation . . . as 
jurisdictional”; as such, we must follow the Supreme 
Court’s “readily administrable bright line” rule and treat 
the statutory language as nonjurisdictional.  Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 516.  Whether a person “is violating, or is about to 
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violate” the law relates to the merits of a Section 13(b) 
claim, and does not indicate that Congress intended to strip 
district courts of their authority to resolve the FTC’s claim.  
Because “nothing in [Section 13(b)] displays any intent to 
withdraw federal jurisdiction . . . we will not presume that 
the statute means what it neither says nor fairly implies.”  
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 
635, 644 (2002). 
We conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345. 
Case: 18-1807     Document: 003113168507     Page: 18      Date Filed: 02/25/2019
 19 
 
III.12 
A. 
The FTC Act declares “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce” to be unlawful, 15 
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), and directs the FTC to prevent 
violations of the Act, id. § 45(a)(2).  The FTC has multiple 
instruments in its toolbox to combat unfair methods of 
competition; among these are administrative proceedings 
and lawsuits in federal court.  See id. §§ 45(b), 53(b). 
Section 5(b), the FTC’s administrative remedy, is 
its traditional enforcement tool.  See id. § 45(b).  Since its 
inception, the FTC Act has provided for administrative 
                                                 
12 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Because Section 13(b)’s requirements are 
nonjurisdictional, we consider the dismissal to be under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order 
granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 765 
(3d Cir. 2013).  We accept “all well-pleaded allegations in 
the complaint as true and view[] them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Id.  The movant can obtain 
relief only if the complaint’s allegations, “however true, 
could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.”  Id. 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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proceedings to remedy unfair methods of competition.  
Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018)).  If the FTC 
has “reason to believe” that a person, partnership, or 
corporation “has been or is using” unfair methods of 
competition, the FTC can issue an administrative 
complaint “stating its charges in that respect.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(b).  If after receiving the FTC’s complaint the 
respondent contests the charges, the parties adjudicate in a 
trial-type proceeding in front of an administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”).  Either party may appeal the ALJ’s 
decision.  If the FTC believes the respondent is violating 
the law, it issues a written report and serves a cease and 
desist order upon the respondent.  Id.  The respondent has 
sixty days to seek review “in the appropriate court of 
appeals.”13  Id. 
In addition to cease and desist orders, Section 5 
provides for limited monetary remedies.  If a respondent 
violates a cease and desist order, the FTC may seek a civil 
penalty of no more than $10,000 per violation.  Id. § 45(l).  
The civil penalty is recoverable in a “civil action brought 
by the Attorney General.”  Id.  The FTC may also file a 
civil action to recover a penalty for knowing violations of 
                                                 
13 The appropriate court of appeals is “any circuit 
where the method of competition . . . was used or where 
[the respondent] resides or carries on business.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(c). 
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rules “respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  Id. 
§ 45(m)(1)(A).  In these actions the District Court is 
permitted “to grant mandatory injunctions and such other 
and further equitable relief” as appropriate to enforce the 
FTC’s final order.  Id. § 45(l). 
Section 13 authorizes the FTC—in certain 
circumstances—to file suit in federal district court.  Unlike 
Section 5, Section 13 was not part of the original FTC Act.  
Rather, Section 13(b) was added later in an effort to solve 
one of the main problems of the FTC’s relatively slow-
moving administrative regime—the need to quickly enjoin 
ongoing or imminent illegal conduct.  In Section 5 
proceedings, the FTC must prevail to obtain a cease and 
desist order.  See id. § 45(b).  Even if the FTC issues a 
cease and desist order, it must seek a court’s aid in 
enforcing the order.  Id. § 45(l)  To remedy this 
shortcoming and allow a quicker response, Congress 
amended the FTC Act in 1973 to allow the FTC to obtain 
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in 
federal court whenever it “has reason to believe” that 
violations of the FTC Act are occurring or are about to 
occur.  Id. § 53(b).  Section 13(b) thus empowers the FTC 
to speedily address ongoing or impending illegal conduct, 
rather than wait for an administrative proceeding to 
conclude.  See id. 
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B. 
The crux of the FTC’s claim is that it is entitled to 
pursue immediate relief in the District Court under Section 
13(b), rather than via the administrative remedy set forth 
in Section 5.  We begin with the text of the FTC Act.  See 
Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“When the statute’s language is plain, the 
sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition 
required by the [text] is not absurd—is to enforce it 
according to its terms.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Section 13(b) provides, in relevant part, 
Whenever the [FTC] has reason to believe— 
(1) that any person, partnership, or 
corporation is violating, or is about to 
violate, any provision of law enforced 
by [the FTC,] and 
(2) that the enjoining thereof 
pending the issuance of a complaint by 
the [FTC] and until such complaint is 
dismissed by the [FTC] or set aside by 
the court on review, or until the order 
of the [FTC] made thereon has become 
final, would be in the interest of the 
public— 
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the [FTC] by any of its attorneys designated 
by it for such purpose may bring suit in a 
district court of the United States to enjoin 
any such act or practice.  Upon a proper 
showing that, weighing the equities and 
considering the [FTC]’s likelihood of 
ultimate success, such action would be in the 
public interest, and after notice to the 
defendant, a temporary restraining order or a 
preliminary injunction may be granted 
without bond:  Provided, however, That if a 
complaint is not filed within such period (not 
exceeding 20 days) as may be specified by 
the court after issuance of the temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction, 
the order or injunction shall be dissolved by 
the court and be of no further force and effect:  
Provided further, That in proper cases the 
[FTC] may seek, and after proper proof, the 
court may issue, a permanent injunction. 
15 U.S.C. § 53(b)(1)–(2) (first emphasis added). 
Section 13(b) requires that the FTC have reason to 
believe a wrongdoer “is violating” or “is about to violate” 
the law.  Id. § 53(b)(1).  We conclude that this language is 
unambiguous; it prohibits existing or impending conduct.  
Simply put, Section 13(b) does not permit the FTC to bring 
a claim based on long-past conduct without some evidence 
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that the defendant “is” committing or “is about to” commit 
another violation. 
The plain language of Section 13(b) is reinforced by 
its history.  “Generally, where the text of a statute is 
unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written 
and only the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure 
from that language.”  Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 
F.3d at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted).  When 
Congress added Section 13(b), the provision was expected 
to be used for obtaining injunctions against illegal conduct 
pending completion of FTC administrative hearings.  See 
S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 30 (1973) (“The purpose of 
[Section 13(b)] is to permit the [FTC] to bring an 
immediate halt to unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
when . . . [a]t the present time such practices might 
continue for several years until agency action is 
completed.”).  The provision was not designed to address 
hypothetical conduct or the mere suspicion that such 
conduct may yet occur.  Cf. id. (explaining that Section 
13(b) is meant to “bring an immediate halt to unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices. . . .”).  Nor was it meant to 
duplicate Section 5, which already prohibits past conduct. 
C. 
The FTC’s arguments to the contrary are 
unconvincing.  The FTC contends that relief under Section 
13(b) is appropriate when it shows a reasonable likelihood 
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that past violations will recur.  In other words, “when a 
defendant has already violated the law but the illegal 
conduct has ceased, injunctive relief should be granted if 
‘there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent 
violation.’”  Br. of Appellant 21 (quoting United States v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). 
The FTC borrows its “likelihood of recurrence” 
standard from the common law standard for an award of 
injunctive relief.  A party can generally obtain injunctive 
relief for past conduct that is likely to recur; the wrongdoer 
cannot avoid an injunction by voluntarily ceasing its 
illegal conduct.  W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632.  
Although injunctive relief can survive discontinuance of 
the illegal conduct, “the moving party must satisfy the 
court that relief is needed.  The necessary determination is 
that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent 
violation, something more than the mere possibility which 
serves to keep the case alive.”  Id. at 633. 
The FTC insists that other courts have 
“consistently” applied the likelihood of recurrence 
standard in Section 13(b) cases.  Br. of Appellant 21–22.  
This is true, and unsurprising, given that Section 13(b) 
explicitly authorizes the FTC to obtain injunctions.  But 
none of the cases cited by the FTC considers the issue 
presented here—the meaning of Section 13(b)’s threshold 
requirement that a party “is” violating or “is about to” 
violate the law. 
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The FTC relies heavily on Federal Trade 
Commission v. Evans Products Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1087 
(9th Cir. 1985).  There, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of an injunction 
under Section 13(b), ruling that “an injunction will issue 
only if the wrongs are ongoing or likely to recur.”  Id.  The 
FTC sued a home seller at least two years after it had 
stopped making allegedly illegal misrepresentations.  Id. 
at 1085–88.  The district court denied the FTC’s motion 
for an injunction; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that 
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the seller’s conduct had completely ceased and was not 
likely to recur.14  Id. 
In another case cited by the FTC, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Accusearch Inc., the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a Section 13(b) 
injunction prohibiting the operator of a website that sold 
illegally-acquired personal data from engaging in future 
misconduct.  570 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009).  The 
Tenth Circuit did not even quote—let alone analyze—
Section 13(b)’s “about to violate” language because it was 
                                                 
14 Although the result in Evans Products Co. cuts 
against the FTC, the Commission tries to rely on portions 
of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, did not interpret “about to violate.”  See Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Evans Prods. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1086 
(9th Cir. 1985).  Instead, it gave Chevron deference to the 
FTC’s interpretation of a different part of Section 13(b)—
the so-called permanent injunction proviso.  See id.  The 
FTC claimed that the permanent injunction proviso was a 
standalone cause of action that authorized it to obtain a 
permanent injunction against violations of any provision 
of law it enforced.  See id.  Here, however, the FTC has 
expressly disclaimed reliance on the permanent injunction 
proviso, see Br. of Appellant 23 n.8, making the FTC’s 
arguments relying on Evans Products Co. at best 
inapposite and at worst misleading. 
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clear that the website operator had the capacity and 
motivation to engage in similar conduct in the future.  See 
id. at 1202.  The Tenth Circuit did not address whether the 
FTC had properly filed suit under Section 13(b). 
The FTC next protests that our interpretation of “is 
about to violate” would make it harder to get in the 
courthouse door than to win injunctive relief.15  The FTC 
contends that the likelihood of recurrence standard—
which applies when a court is considering whether to grant 
or deny injunctive relief—must be the sole standard to 
plead a Section 13(b) claim.  But the FTC cannot 
overcome Congress’s plain language in Section 13(b), 
which requires the FTC to plead, at the time it files suit, 
that a violation “is” occurring or “is about to” occur.  15 
U.S.C. § 53(b).  Furthermore, the FTC ignores that the 
“about to violate” and “likelihood of recurrence” standards 
coexist.  The “about to violate” pleading requirement—
                                                 
15 The FTC argues that the District Court erred by 
imposing a “higher” pleading threshold of “imminent 
recurrence.”  Br. of Appellant 22.  The FTC is wrong.  The 
District Court never imposed an imminence requirement.  
In fact, it didn’t even use the word “imminent” in its 
opinion.  The Court held that the factual allegations in the 
FTC’s complaint failed to “plausibly suggest [Shire] is 
‘about to violate’ any law enforced by the FTC, 
particularly when the alleged misconduct ceased almost 
five years before filing of the complaint.”  Op. 12. 
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which is applied right out of the gate—is not inconsistent 
with the likelihood of recurrence standard, which a court 
uses to determine the FTC’s entitlement to an injunction. 
The FTC also places much weight on cases 
interpreting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  These Acts permit the Securities 
Exchange Commission to seek injunctive relief in federal 
court when a defendant “is engaged” or is “about to 
engage” in a violation of securities laws.  15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77t(b) and 78u(d)(1).  We reject the FTC’s invitation to 
import the interpretation of “is” or “is about to” contained 
in cases interpreting the securities laws.  We “look to other 
statutes pertaining to the same subject matter which 
contain similar terms” only if “the ordinary meaning of a 
statute and the statute’s legislative history fail to provide 
sufficient guidance to a term’s meaning.”  Liberty Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 171 F.3d 818, 823 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  Here, the plain language of Section 13(b) 
answers the question for us—“is about to violate” means 
something more than a past violation and a likelihood of 
recurrence.  If we were in doubt, the structure and history 
of the FTC Act support our interpretation.  Moreover, the 
statutory scheme—the addition of Section 13(b) to cure a 
shortcoming of Section 5(b)—is not similar to the 
securities laws, which have always permitted suits for 
injunctions.  See also Amicus Br. of Washington Legal 
Foundation 9 (“While several other statutes include 
language similar to the FTC’s ‘about to violate’ language, 
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none of those statutes include agency-litigating authority 
that even remotely resembles the overall structure and 
history of the FTC Act.”). 
Finally, the FTC trots out the old adage that a 
remedial statute like the FTC Act should be construed 
broadly.  Because Section 13(b)’s “is” or “is about to” 
requirement allegedly conflicts with the remedial purpose 
of the FTC Act, the FTC says we should disregard the 
plain meaning of that language.  Of course, none of the 
authority the FTC cites stands for the broad proposition 
that we can ignore clear statutory language if it does not 
promote a remedial interpretation.  See Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (explaining that 
“generalized references” to “remedial purposes” of a 
statute will “not justify reading a provision more broadly 
than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably 
permit” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The FTC points to a parade of horribles that it 
predicts will result if we uphold the District Court’s 
decision.16  See, e.g., Br. of Appellant 35 (“Limiting the 
FTC’s Section 13(b) authority to cases of ongoing or 
imminent violation would make it easy for wrongdoers to 
                                                 
16 The FTC also claims that the District Court’s 
interpretation could interfere with other statutes that 
contain similar language.  Given the unique history and 
structure of the FTC Act, we consider this fear unfounded. 
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evade Congress’ purposes in creating the regime.  As soon 
as a potential defendant got wind that the FTC was 
investigating its activities, it could simply stop those 
activities and render itself immune from suit in federal 
court unless the FTC could allege and prove an imminent 
re-violation.”).  But there is no reason to believe that our 
decision today unnecessarily restricts the FTC’s ability to 
address wrongdoing.  Section 5 authorizes administrative 
proceedings based on past violations.  And, of course, if 
the FTC believes that a wrongdoer is “about to violate” the 
law during the pendency of an administrative proceeding, 
it could then come to court and obtain an injunction under 
Section 13(b). 
The FTC’s understandable preference for litigating 
under Section 13(b), rather than in an administrative 
proceeding, does not justify its expansion of the statutory 
language.  If the FTC wants to recover for a past 
violation—where an entity “has been” violating the law—
it must use Section 5(b).  15 U.S.C. § 45(b).  If the FTC 
instead chooses to use Section 13(b), it must plead that a 
violation of the law “is” occurring or “is about to” occur.  
Id. § 53(b).  Here, the FTC wants to use the most 
advantageous aspects of each statutory provision—to 
punish Shire for a past violation using the less onerous 
enforcement mechanism.  But the FTC’s attempt to 
squeeze Shire’s conduct into the “about to violate” 
category distorts Section 13(b) beyond its intended 
purpose.  Section 13(b) cannot accommodate the FTC’s 
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interpretation—that “about to violate” means only that a 
violation could recur at some future point. 
In short, we reject the FTC’s contention that Section 
13(b)’s “is violating” or “is about to violate” language can 
be satisfied by showing a violation in the distant past and 
a vague and generalized likelihood of recurrent conduct.17  
Instead, “is” or “is about to violate” means what it says—
the FTC must make a showing that a defendant is violating 
or is about to violate the law. 
                                                 
17 The FTC also asserts that Section 13(b)’s “reason 
to believe” language confers upon it unreviewable 
discretion to file suit.  See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (“Whenever 
the Commission has reason to believe—(1) that any 
person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about 
to violate, any provision of law. . .[the FTC] may bring 
suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any 
such act or practice.” (emphasis added)).  We decline to 
consider this argument because the FTC failed to raise it 
in the District Court.  Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 
277, 284 (3d Cir. 2018) (“It is well established that 
arguments not raised before the District Court are waived 
on appeal.” (internal citation omitted)).  Even if this 
argument were not waived, we would find it unpersuasive.  
Here, there is no evidence to support the FTC’s “reason to 
believe” Shire is violating or is about to violate the law. 
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D. 
Here, the FTC never initiated Section 5 proceedings 
against Shire.18  Instead, the FTC waited until five years 
after Shire had stopped its allegedly illegal conduct before 
seeking an injunction under Section 13(b).  Viewed under 
the correct standard, the FTC’s complaint fails to allege 
that Shire “is violating” or “is about to violate” the law.  
The FTC does not contest that Shire is not currently 
violating the law.  Indeed, Shire divested itself of 
Vancocin in 2014, two years after generic competition 
entered the market. 
Instead, the FTC relies on Section 13(b)’s “is about 
to violate” language.  The few factual allegations in the 
FTC’s forty-five page complaint that suggest Shire “is 
about to violate” the law are woefully inadequate to state 
a claim under Section 13(b).  The FTC alleges generally 
that Shire “is engaged in the business of, among other 
things, developing, manufacturing, and marketing branded 
drug products, including inter alia, Cinryze.”  Compl. ¶ 8.  
As to the likelihood that Shire will engage in illegal 
                                                 
18 At oral argument in the District Court, the FTC 
explained that it “generally” pursues administrative 
proceedings and a preliminary injunction simultaneously.  
App. 381.  It is unclear why the FTC did not use that 
strategy here, particularly when Shire’s allegedly illegal 
conduct ceased long before the FTC filed suit. 
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behavior, the FTC alleges, “[a]bsent an injunction, there is 
a cognizable danger that [Shire] will engage in similar 
conduct causing future harm to competition and 
consumers.  [Shire] knowingly carried out its 
anticompetitive and meritless petitioning campaign to 
preserve its monopoly profits.  It did so conscious of the 
fact that this conduct would greatly enrich it at the expense 
of consumers.”  Id. ¶ 150.  Without mentioning Cinryze by 
name, the FTC alleges that Shire “has the incentive and 
opportunity to continue to engage in similar conduct in the 
future.  At all relevant times, [Shire] marketed and 
developed drug products for commercial sale in the United 
States, and it could do so in the future.  Consequently, 
[Shire] has the incentive to obstruct or delay competition 
to these or other products.”  Id. ¶ 151. 
The District Court concluded that these vague 
allegations failed to “plausibly suggest [Shire] is ‘about to 
violate’ any law enforced by the FTC, particularly when 
the alleged misconduct ceased almost five years before 
filing of the complaint.”  Op. 12.  We agree.  Taking the 
factual allegations in the complaint as true, Shire stopped 
its sham petitioning campaign in 2012 when the FDA 
approved generic equivalents to Vancocin.  The complaint 
contains no allegations that Shire engaged in sham 
petitioning in the five-year gap between the 2012 cessation 
in petitioning and the 2017 lawsuit.  The complaint also 
lacks specific allegations that Shire is “about to violate” 
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the law by petitioning as to Cinryze, the only other drug 
mentioned. 
At oral argument in the District Court, the FTC 
provided more support for its argument that Shire “is about 
to violate” the law.  The FTC explained that Shire is 
“perfectly positioned” to commit violations in the future 
because it is already marketing a “blockbuster drug” that 
is in the pipeline.  Id. at 11.  That drug, Cinryze, is not ripe 
for generic entry but has “the same type of significance as 
Vancocin . . . .”  Id.  We need not consider whether these 
allegations might satisfy the pleading standard.  None of 
these facts—other than that Shire markets Cinryze—are 
pleaded in the complaint, which the FTC chose not to 
amend.  Based upon the pleading before us, we conclude 
that the FTC has failed to plead that Shire is “about to 
violate” any law. 
In this case, given the paucity of allegations in the 
complaint, the FTC fails to state a claim under any 
reasonable definition of “about to violate.”  Whatever the 
outer reach of “about to violate” may be, the facts in this 
case do not approach it.19  We therefore leave for another 
                                                 
19 We also reject the FTC’s standalone claim for 
equitable monetary relief.  Assuming that such relief is 
available under Section 13(b), the FTC must still meet the 
“is” or “is about to” requirement. 
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day the exact confines of Section 13(b)’s “about to 
violate” language. 
IV. 
Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the FTC must 
plead that Shire “is” violating or “is about to” violate the 
law.  But Shire indisputably is not currently violating the 
law, nor is it alleged to be poised to do so anytime in the 
foreseeable future.  The FTC thus fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
The FTC’s improper use of Section 13(b) to pursue 
long-past petitioning has the potential to discourage lawful 
petitioning activity by interested citizens—activity that is 
protected by the First Amendment.  Because we affirm the 
District Court’s judgment dismissing the complaint, we 
need not address the issue further but suggest that the FTC 
be mindful of such First Amendment concerns. 
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